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COMMENTS
IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY*
This article deals with the use of impartial medical expert witnesses
in personal injury actions. It will consider the need for such experts,
the various plans which have been devised to utilize the impartial ex-
pert, the administration of these plans and a summary of the good and
bad points of the various plans.
There is widespread dissatisfaction with the manner in which medi-
cal testimony is presented in personal injury litigation. This dissatis-
faction is by no means a recent development. In 1915, Dr. J. W. Court-
ney, addressing the graduating class at Harvard Medical School, said:
"The present mode of procedure in our courts, in so far as medical
testimony is concerned, is not a particularly edifying one."1 This early
expression of disapproval has been elaborated on by both doctors and
lawyers alike. The basic causes of this dissatisfaction are that the tra-
ditional adversary system has caused parties in an action to select the
"best witness" rather than the best scientist; the present system allows
partisan expert 'testimony for the plaintiff to be countered by partisan
expert testimony for the defendant with a resultant "battle of experts"
leaving the jury hopelessly confused. 2 These two problems frustrate
the attainment of truth and justice in a given case. A further cause of
discontentment with the present handling of expert testimony is the
time consumed in presenting it. The serious backlog of cases on many
court calendars has caused great concern.3 It is estimated that about
80% of the civil jury cases in this country are personal injury cases,4
and a majority of the issues in these cases turn on medical questions.5
The time spent in litigating these cases is an important factor in court
congestion.
The first two reasons for dissatisfaction with the present approach
mentioned above are closely related. The medical testimony on the part
of the plaintiff will often consist in testimony by the family physician
or personal physician of the plaintiff who treated him subsequent to
the injury. There may also be experts called in to substantiate the testi-
mony of the attending physician. The testimony of the former is sub-
*This article was prepared for the Judicial Council of the State of Wisconsin
in response to a request from the Wisconsin Supreme Court to the Judicial
Council for research on the topic of impartial medical testimony.
1 Quoted by Frederic E. Elliott and Ramsay Spillman in "Medical Testimony
m Personal Injury Cases, 2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 466 (1935).
2 McCoRMIcK, EvIDENCE §17 (1954).
3Address by Bernard Botein before the Section of Judicial Administration of
the American Bar Association, Upper Ohio Valley Regional Meeting in Pitts-
burgh, Penn., March 11, 1959, in MEDICAL-LEGAL COMMITTEE OF THE AL-
LEGHENY COUNTY (PENN.) MEDICAL SOCIETY, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY(1961) (hereinafter cited as MEDICAL-LEGAL COMMITTEE).
4 Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1963, p. 1, col. 1.
5 Julien, Alfred S., Impartial Medical Plans, 1960 INs. L. J. 213, 214 (1960).
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ject to being partisan and biased because of subtle influences that might
encourage him to seek any objective finding to support the claims of
the injured party. The patient expects the doctor to be sympathetic,
and the physician is anxious to be of help.6 Loyalty and friendship may
cause the physician, consciously or unconsciously, to make his testimony
favor the side that calls him. 7
It has been pointed out that in considering the testimony of the
treating physician, it must be borne in mind that a civil trial is not
totally unlike a private fight and that "partisanship is infectious and
doctors are human in that regard. The worst that can be said of treating
physicians is that they will not give their patients the worse of it on
a close medical question."8
The situation is not regarded the same for a physician who has
been retained by the attorney and not by the patient. These men are not
generally selected because of their impartiality. The New York Report,
after pointing out that some doctors are above suspicion and a few are
corrupt goes on to state that
[iun between are a number who become infected with bias when
called as witnesses in the conventional way. Cast in the roles of
partisans, subjected to hostile cross examination and paid by one
side, they tend to color their testimony. Their opinions may be
expressed a little more strongly than the facts or state of medical
knowledge warrant; and needed reservation may be omitted
when convenient. As experts, they receive not ordinary witness
fees, but special compensation, sometimes very substantial in
amount. Too often their testimony reflects the partisan source
from which their compensation comes.9
This problem of the plaintiff building a case to maximum effective-
ness by a careful selection of expert witnesses is met by a similar ap-
proach from the defendant, often an insurer with a group of consistently
retained medical experts. The defendant's evidence is also often par-
tisan. The result is that an array of witnesses for each side will be
paraded before the jury. This "battle of experts" or "medical-legal
tournament" has been dramatized by one judge:
ACT I. Q. Doctor A, as expert for the plaintiff, to what
degree, in your opinion is the plaintiff disabled?
A. He is totally and permanently disabled.
ACT II. Q. Doctor B, as expert for the defendant, to what
degree, in your opinion is the plaintiff disabled?
A. He is not disabled at all. He could work if he wanted to.
He is a malingerer and a loafer.'0
6 Douglas, Book Review, 31 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 166, 167 (1956).
7 Allman, Impartial Medical Testimony, 27 INS. COUNSEL J. 184 (1960).8 Botein, supra note 3.
9 SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrTy OF NEW
YORK ON THE MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY PROJECT, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL
TESTIMONY 7 (1956) (hereinafter cited a- SPECIAL COMMITTEE).10 Address by Emory H. Niles before the Section of the Judicial Administration
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This, of course, represents the most extreme situation. But less
extreme divergences of opinion are commonplace. Witnesses in the
adversary system have the tendency to give testimony favorable to the
side which has called them, and perhaps they sooth their consciences
by "leaving it to the jury."'1
The jury of laymen, confronted with the task of ascertaining the
truth from the morass created by the conflicting and often complex
technical expert opinions is helpless. The best that can be done, it
seems, is to evaluate the opinions in terms of the personality of the
witness giving it. Thus, the "battle of experts" leads to a search for
the "best" witness. "Medical advocacy, guided by legal advocacy, be-
comes a marketable commodity."' 2
This unhealthy situation is also one of the most basic causes of con-
gestion in the courts. Many personal injury cases go to trial simply be-
cause of the irreconcilable medical opinions presented by the experts
for both parties. The time spent on these cases is out of proportion to
the number of cases.1
3
Further evidence of the dissatisfaction of the present method of
handling the medical testimony is the distaste which many in the medical
profession have for court appearances.
Opposing counsel frequently infers incompetence, carelessness,
untruthfulness and bias, and leaves the doctor frustrated and
outraged with the condition made worse by court decorum which
prevents expression of his feelings. Is it any cause for wonder
that the average doctor is unwilling to appear in court and be
subjected to such an inquisition.' 4
A further reason why doctors dislike court appearances is incon-
venience caused when they wait to be called as a witness.
Thus the use of partisan expert medical witnesses in the adversary
system has caused a "battle of experts" which frustrates the basic pur-
pose of expert testimony-that is, to inform the jury on matters not
within their knowledge. Furthermore, court congestion can be traced
to the use of partisan experts.
It was mentioned above that this problem is not one that has re-
cently arisen. Solutions for the problem have not been lacking either.
Suggested Solutions
The solutions have varied. One of the more widespread is that
medical and bar associations educated their respective members as to
of the American Bar Association in Dallas, Texas, August 28, 1956, in
MEDICAL-LEGAL CoMMIrTEE, op. cit. supra note 3.
21 Ibid.
12 Botein, supra note 3.
Is SPECIAL CoMmrrTEE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 9.
'4Gannon, The Doctor and the Lawyer, 25 J.B.A.D.C. 132 (1958), quoted in
Comment, Impartial Medical Testimony-A New Horizon, 32 TEMPLE L. Q.
193, 194 (1959).
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their responsibilities in the administration of justice. This may lead
to tolerance of, but not a solution for, the problem.'5
A second approach has been to set a higher standard for competency
in experts. At present a properly licensed general practitioner is able
to testify in court,'16 perhaps on subjects requiring specialized medical
training. In Wisconsin, the court must be satisfied that the witness is
a medical expert.17 It has been suggested that this policy may increase
the caliber of the medical witness who testifies in court, but it does not
strike at the roots of partisanship.'8
The suggestion has been made that an increase in the fee paid an
expert witness may encourage the willingness on the part of qualified
physicians to testify.19 But here problems are encountered in the areas
of partisanship and the doctors' willingness to be made subject to cross-
examination.
Another proposed solution to the problem under discussion is the
one adopted in Minnesota. It consists of disciplinary measures used by
professional groups for doctors and lawyers who are suspected of
falsifying claims. It has been pointed out that this is not effective in
the area of competency.2 0
A much more extreme approach is that a jury of experts decide the
case. Here there are severe constitutional difficulties. 2'
The suggestion that a panel consisting of a legal expert, a medical
expert and a layman be set up to arbitrate medical claims is subject to
similar objections.22
Perhaps the most common answer offered to the problems involved
in presenting expert evidence is that the court resort to its common law
power of calling expert witnesses.23 This power has received much
recognition in the United States.24 Some states have codified this power
making it applicable to specific situations. For example, in Wisconsin,
the court may appoint an expert in a criminal case involving the issue
of sanity.2 5
This idea-that the court has the power to call its own expert wit-
nesses-was the foundation for the Model Expert Testimony Act ap-
proved in the year 1937 (adopted only in South Dakota) 26 and the
".5JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF MICHIGAN, Impartial Medical Testinony in Civil
Actions, in MEDICAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 3.
16 See Wis. STAT. §147.14(2) (a) (1961).
'7 WIS. STAT. §147.14(2) (b) (1961).
1L8 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF MICHIGAN, supra note 15.
s Ibid.; cf. Wis. STAT. §271.04(2) (1961).2 0 SPECIAL CoMMnTEE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 10.
212 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §563 (3d ed.).
22 Ibid.
23 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §17 (1954).
24 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2484 (3d. ed.).
25 WIs. STAT. §957.27 (1961). See also, Beuscher, A Code of Evidence for Wis-
consin-Expert Witnesses, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 593 (1945).
26 MCCORMiCK, EVIDFNCE §17, n. 13 (1954).
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more recent Uniform Rules of Evidence (approved only in the Virgin
Islands and the Panama Canal Zone). Rule 59 of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence provides that in the event the judge determines that the
appearance of an expert is desirable, he shall make this fact known to
the parties and issue an order to show cause why an expert should not
be appointed. After a hearing on the matter, the judge will request
nominations. If the parties agree on a particular expert or experts the
judge shall appoint him or them. If the parties do not agree, the judge
makes his own selection. The expert must first consent to act before
his appointment is effective. The judge shall set out the duties of the
expert in a conference with the expert and the parties. The expert shall
advise the parties of his findings and may be called to testify by the
judge or by the parties. He may be examined and cross examined by
each party. The parties may call their own expert witnesses in addition
to the court appointed expert. The expert appointed by the court is
paid a reasonable fee, determined by the court, paid equally by each
party as part of the costs of the action. This is provided for in Rule 60
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. There is also provision made that
"the fact of the appointment of an expert witness by the judge may
be revealed to the trier of the facts as relevant to the credibility of
such witness and the weight of his testimony. ' 27 This provision is one
that has caused sharp criticism. The argument is that this allows a cloak
of infallibility to be placed around the expert with the result that the
finding of the jury will correspond to the opinion of the expert.28
The most recent solution to the problems encountered in presenting
expert medical testimony are the impartial medical expert systems. The
following pages will involve a detailed study of these various systems.
The idea behind these systems does not radically differ from the idea
upon which the Uniform Rules of Evidence were based: the court has
the power to call its own expert witnesses. What does clearly differenti-
ate these various plans from the Uniform Rules is the procedure es-
tablished so that the court can utilize expert witnesses. These various
plans take hold of the idea embodied in the Uniform Rules, project it
specifically into the area of personal injury litigation and provide an
effective, practical implementation of the idea. Since this implementa-
tion is the highlight of these plans, the manner in which it is effectu-
ated under the various proposals will be given close consideration.
Impartial Medical Testimony Systems
The first place in which a program was established was New York
County. The New York County Medical Expert Testimony Project
was set up in 1952 with the aid of two $20,000 grants.
27 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE §61.
28 DeParcq, Uniform Rules of Evidence-A Defendant's View, 40 MINN. L.
REv. 301.334 (1956); Geer and Adamson, Uniform Rides of Evidence-A
Defendant's View, 40 MINN. L. REV. 347, 360-61 (1956).
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Basically, the idea behind the Medical Expert Testimony Project
was to set up panels of neutral, outstanding physicians in various
specialized branches of medicine. These experts would be avail-
able at the call of the court to make medical examinations of
plaintiffs in personal injury cases, report their findings, and, if
necessary testify, in those cases in which the medical aspects were
controversial and substantial.
29
The project was set up as a pilot experiment for a two year period.
The first step in implementing the idea, after financing had been
secured, was to select the experts who would serve on the panels set
up under the project. This was handled by the medical societies. The
requirements for membership on the panels were that the doctor must
be a recognized and leading authority in the branch of medicine in-
volved and not be identified by reason of his previous practice as an
expert for either plaintiffs or defendants. The areas of medicine in
which a panel of experts was required and the number of doctors to
serve on the panel was determined by the Justices of the Supreme
Court (New York trial court). The doctors selected came primarily
from the staffs of large hospitals and the faculties of medical schools.
The doctors responded to the invitation to serve on a panel in a willing
spirit.30 The number of panels established was fifteen3' with membership
varying from one (malignancy and trauma panel) to fifteen (ortho-
pedics panel). The total number of doctors serving was ninety-seven.
The next step was to set up the legal framewoi-k within which the
panels were to function. This was done by a special rule of the Appel-
fate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department. The rule is as
follows:
1. There is established by the Supreme Court for the County of
New York an office to be known as the Medical Report Office,
which shall be in charge of a deputy clerk of the Supreme Court.
2. In any personal injury case in which, prior to the trial there-
of, a justice shall be of the opinion that an examination of the
injured person and a report thereon by an impartial medical ex-
pert would be of material aid to the just determination of the case
he may, after consultation with counsel for the respective parties,
order such examination and report, without cost to the parties,
through the Medical Report Office of the Supreme Court, New
York County. The examination will be made by a member of a
panel of examining physicians designated for their particular
qualifications by the New York Academy of Medicine and New
York County Medical Society. Copies of the report of the ex-
29 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 3.
30 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT
113-124 (1959).
31 Panels were: general surgery, plastic surgery, ophthalmology, cardiovascular
diseases, dermatology, tuberculosis, internal medicine, neurosurgery, neurology,
psychiatry, neuropsychiatry, roentgenology, orthopedics, otolaryngology, ob-
stetrics and gynecology, genitourinary diseases, malignancy and trauma, endo-
crinology. SPECIAL COMMITTEE, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 83.
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amining physician will be made available by the clerk of the
Medical Report Office to all parties.
3. If the case proceeds to trial after such examination and re-
port, either party may call the examining physician as a witness
or the trial justice may, if he deems it desirable to do so, call
the examining physician as a witness for the court, subject to
questioning by any party, but without cost to any party.32
The next important step to be taken was to devise a method for
selecting cases for referral to the panel. The Justices of the Supreme
Court felt that this should be accomplished early in the history of the
litigation so that an accurate examination could be made and also so
that the possibility of settlement before trial could be increased. 33
It was decided that the possibility of referral to a medical panel
would be considered when the case come up on the regular pre-trial
calendar. At the pre-trial conference the judge has before him the
medical report of the doctors for plaintiff and for defendant and other
reports if there are any. If these reveal a substantial variance as to the
nature and extent of the injury suffered, and the judge believes using
a panel examination would be helpful, he orders a referral. Consent
of the attorneys is not necessary.
The judge, without knowledge of the names of the doctors on a
panel, indicates the particular panel to which referral is to be made
and points out the conflicting reports as they appear from the records
before him. The pre-trial conference is then adjourned until the panel
doctor's report is completed.
The attorneys for the litigants go to the Medical Report Office where
the examination is arranged. The clerk, working in this office, takes the
name of a doctor serving on a particular panel and schedules an ex-
amination after consulting the doctor and the parties as to a mutually
convenient time. The names of the doctors on a panel are kept confi-
dential and they serve on a rotation basis.
34
The clerk then sends a letter to the doctor confirming the appoint-
ment and setting forth instructions to the doctor. The set of instructions
for the doctor state that he is in complete control of the examination
and may allow or exclude the attendance of attorneys for the parties.
The doctor is authorized to order whatever tests he deems necessary.35
The medical reports available at the time of the pre-trial conference
are supplied to the expert. He may request additional hospital records
that he feels are needed and they are subpoenaed to the doctor's office.
These reports are sent to the doctor's office enough in advance to assure
maximum familiarity with the case on the part of the expert.
36
321d. at 14.
33 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, op. cit. supra note 30.
34 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 15-16.
35 Id. at 90.
36 Id. at 16.
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The examination itself is similar to the ordinary physical examina-
tion. Treatment is not the object of this examination, naturally. At the
conclusion of the examination, the doctor prepares his report in tripli-
cate. These are sent to the Medical Report Office along with a bill for
the expert's services. The report is forwarded to the court and the
attorneys.
What use is then made of the report? At the resumed pre-trial con-
ference it is used to effectuate a settlement if possible. Perhaps, as a
result of the report having been made, the parties will agree to submit
the case to a court of more limited jurisdiction (city court: $6000 juris-
dictional limit). There is also the possibility that the case may follow
the normal course to trial.37
In the event that the trial does come about, it is possible that the
expert may be called to give oral testimony regarding the finding of his
examination. This may be done by the court or by either of the parties.
This is said to be allowed with three primary objectives in mind:
I) Judge and jury will have an "impartial, highly informed fac-
tual basis" to aid them in resolving conflicting medical opinions.
2) It will serve as a deterrent to anyone who may consider using
misleading or false medical opinions-the risk: exposure by an
outstanding medical expert.
3) It is often a catalyst for settlement at the pre-trial for both
plaintiff and defendant will reconsider their claims when the
expert's report and possibly his testimony are available.' s
In the event that the expert is called to give testimony at a trial,
this is arranged by the Medical Report Office, with the utmost con-
sideration given to the doctor and his busy schedule.
The doctor appears as an expert witness and the fact that he is
court appointed is made known to the jury. If called by a party he may
be cross examined by opposing counsel. The judge may ask any ques-
tions he thinks pertinent. The ordinary rules of evidence are applic-
able. The one possible exception to this being the rule prohibiting a
party from impeaching his own witness, although the point has not
been decided.39 At the conclusion of the case the expert's bill which he
submitted earlier, if approved as is typical, is paid from Project funds.
It is important to note that after the intitial two year period of the
pilot project had passed, the program of impartial medical testimony
was continued, financed by public funds as a part of the regular court
budget. Also the program was adopted in Bronx County in October,
1953. This is interjected here because in discussing results, figures from
both counties may be used.
What are the results of the project? The New York Report, in
37 Id. at 18.
38 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK, op. cit. supra note 30.
39 SPECIAL CoMmrrImE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 19.
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discussing the results of the Project, lists as the most important effect to
be noted the influence the Project has had on cases in which it was not
utilized. The rationale of this statement is the great probability that
exists that many spurious claims were discouraged by the possibility
that an expert from the panel may be called in to expose the improper
claim, and, naturally, embarrass those making the claim.40
Another of the results of the use of the impartial expert-and a
more tangible one-is the disposition of cases without trial.
In the initial two years of the project-its experimental stage-238
cases were referred.
... out of a total of 238 referred to impartial experts, 129 can
be regarded as having been thus far disposed of without com-
plete trial in the Supreme Court.... One hundred and two were
settled before trial, 18 were settled during trial, and eight were
transferred to the City Court. In only 18 cases has trial been
completed.41
Ninety-one cases were still pending. The Report assumes that the
Project could be credited with eliminating one-fifth of the number of
trials in the two counties in which it is used.
The impact of the use of panels of doctors is difficult to gauge
when considered in the light of the doctor giving testimony in court.
The New York Report indicates that the most noticeable feature of
having the impartial doctor testify in court is the treatment he received
there. Although the expert is subject to cross examination and is often
cross examined (perhaps extensively) the type of cross examination
has changed. It is concerned mainly with further exploring the re-
sults of the doctor's examination and report. Gone from the examina-
tion is the embarrassment and harassment stemming from a cross ex-
amination directed at the expert's motives and his competency.4 2 A
leading New York doctor remarked:
When I have been asked to testify, I have been extended every
courtesy. At no time was my professional standing challenged,
nor was there any attempt to imply that my testimony was any-
thing but the truth.43
The costs of the program are the final point for consideration in
the discussion of the results of the New York Project. In the first two
years of the Project $20,383.35 was expended for examination fees
and fees for testifying. The report considered that if attention is paid
only to the number of days in trial saved by dispositions attributable
to the project (other benefits aside) the Project saved 10 times the
amount paid out in fees to the experts. This was on the basis that each
401d. at 27-28.
41 Id. at 30.
42 Id. at 32-33.
4 Wade, lispartial Medical Testimony, 27 INs. C. J. §187-191 (1960).
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trial would have consumed 3 days at $750 per day ($2250 per trial).
The fees that the individual experts charge for their examination
average approximately $90.44 The fee charged for testifying is gener-
ally greater:
The fees for trial testimony have ranged from $25 in one case
to $400 in another. In all, 80 fees were charged (more than the
number of cases since sometimes two or more panel specialists
testified in one case). The fees in only 4 were less than $100.
Thirty-nine charged from $100 to $150, 20 ranged between $150
and $200 and 16 were $200 or over.45
The Report succinctly summarized the accomplishments under the
Project:
1. The Project has improved the process of finding medical facts
in litigated cases.
2. It has helped to relieve court congestion.
3. It has had a wholesome prophylactic effect upon the formula-
tion and presentation of medical testimony in court.
4. It has proved that the modest expenditure involved effects a
large saving and economy in court operations.
5. It has pointed the way to better diagnosis in the field of trau-
matic medicine. Unlike the others listed above, this accomplish-
ment is an unexpected dividend, which was not in contemplation
when the Project was initiated. 46
Since the New York Medical Expert Testimony Project was the
forerunner in the use of impartial medical expert panels, the discussion
of similar plans in different locales will be limited to a general discussion
of the particular plans, noting differences between the specific plan dis-
cussed and the New York Plan.
The next place where a plan of impartial medical testimony was
adopted was Baltimore.
The Honorable Emory H. Niles, Chief Judge, Supreme Bench of
Baltimore stressed that the Baltimore Plan is founded on the common
law power of the judge to call his own expert witnesses. The system
does not have the complete administrative system that New York has;
the matter is handled much more informally. The medical society drew
up lists of men they felt were qualified to serve on the particular panels.
The lists are not published but they are not kept secret. The motion to
utilize an expert from one of the panels must be made by one of the
parties. The judge when informed of this reveals the names of the
doctors (usually three) on a particular panel to the parties. A party's
objection to a particular panelist may cause that panelist to be dropped
from consideration, but this matter rests within .the discretion of the
judge. This varies from the plan of rotation of panel members em-
44 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 92-100.
45 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, op. cit. supra note 30. These
figures are for New York and Bronx Counties through 1957.4 6 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 5.
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ployed in New York. The judge informs the panelist of his appoint-
ment and one of the lawyers is given the duty of arranging the ex-
amination. The doctor's reports, in triplicate, are sent to the judge, who
gives a copy to each of the parties. This procedure eliminates many of
the functions of New York's Medical Report Office. If a settlement can-
not be effectuated, the panel expert may be called as a witness by the
parties. The fact that he is a court appointed expert is made known
to the jury. The impartial expert may be cross examined by the parties
and they may also call other experts.
The Baltimore Plan is different from New York's in that the cost
is not borne by the public, but is usually borne by the litigant calling
the expert witness, but the judge has some discretion here. The panel
expert does not know who has requested his examination and opinion.
The party requesting an expert is required to pay an approximate fee
into court. When the expert is paid, the payment comes through the
clerk of court.
47
The plan has not been used greatly. It has been pointed out that the
weaknesses are the use of an impartial expert must be initiated by one
of the parties, and even then, it is in the judge's discretion to call a
panel expert.
4 8
The first federal court to adopt a plan of impartial medical experts
was the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. This
was done by court rule pursuant to Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as an implementation and extension of Rule 35 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 22 of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reads as follows:
A. In any personal injury case in which prior to the trial thereof,
a judge shall be of the opinion that an examination of the injured
person and a report thereon by an impartial medical expert or
experts would be of material aid to the just determination of
the case, he may, after consultation with counsel for the respec-
tive parties and after giving counsel a hearing, if such hearing
be requested by either counsel, order such examination and re-
port. The examination will be made by a member or members of
a panel of examining physicians designated for their particular
qualification by the Medical Society of the State of Pennsylvania
after consultation with a committee appointed by the President
of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and with the court. Copies
of the report of the examining physician will be made available
to all parties.
B. The compensation of the expert or experts shall be fixed by
the judge ordering the examination and shall be paid equally by
each party to the litigation unless such judge, in his discretion
orders payment to be made otherwise in order to meet special
factual situations.
4 Niles, supra note 10.
48 MJEDICAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 6.
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C. If the case proceeds to trial after such examination and re-
port, either party may call the examining physician or physicians
to testify or the trial judge may, if he deems it desirable to do so,
call the examining physician or physicians as a witness or wit-
nesses, subject to questioning by any party but without com-
pensation by any litigant.
This rule has been challenged on two occasions, the objection to the
rule being it violated the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution, providing for the right to a jury trial in civil actions. The
rule was upheld on both occasions.4 19
The plan may be put into use when the judge feels that it will ma-
terially aid a just determination of the case. The parties are given an
opportunity to have a hearing on the matter. The doctors making the
examination were selected by the State Medical Association. Because
of the larger territory where the plan can be used there are three lists
of panels of experts in a particular specialty. The panels serve in
different geographical regions according to where the plaintiff can be
conveniently examined by the doctor in his office.50 The Clerk of Courts
office handles the list of panel experts, which are kept confidential and
used in a general rotation basis. If the first name given is objected to
by one of the parties, then a second name is given. If there is an ob-
jection to this name, then the judge will designate one of the two."
The expert, after making the examination and report, may be called to
testify by the judge or the parties and may be cross examined.
The feature that differs most from the New York Plan is the
manner of payment. In the Eastern District the doctor's fee is paid
equally by the parties in the general case.5 2 This provision has been
attacked as an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due
process of law, but to no avail.53
The results of the Pennsylvania plan after 23 months are:
24 Cases are settled by examination and report short of trial
10 Cases are settled after the doctor testified at the trial
27 Cases are in the process of procedure
61 Cases total. 4
A similar rule has been adopted in the district court for the North-
ern District of Illinois. The primary difference being that the fees of
49 Van Dusen, The Impartial Medical Expert System: The Judicial Point of
View, 34 TEmPLE L. Q. 1, 9 (1961). The cases were Hankinson v. Van Dusen
and Kraft, 359 U.S. 925 (1959), denying certiorari; Porta v. Penna Railroad
Company (Civil Action No. 21293 in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of
Penn.), aff'd, 272 F. 2d 396 (3d Cir. 1959) (a per curiam decision stating that
the record revealed no error).
50 Van Dusen, id. at 6.
51 MEDICAL LEGAL COmmnTEE, op .cit. supra note 3, at 4.
52 Comment, supra note 14, at 200.
53 Ibid.; the case was Hankinson, supra note 49.54 Address by the Honorable Julius H. Miner to the Illinois State Medical So-
ciety, Committee on Medical Services and Public Relations, May 24, 1960, in
MEDICAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 3.
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the expert are paid by the plaintiff and/or the defendant as directed by
the court. The fee is usually one which the expert would charge to a
patient of moderate circumstances in private practice.55
The state of Utah has adopted a plan of impartial medical testimony
in cases involving occupational diseases and workman's compensation.
The Industrial Commission calls the expert from a list prepared by the
medical society. The experts are divided into panels, headed by a chair-
man, and the specialists serve in rotation. The fees are paid by the In-
dustrial Commission from a fund made up of the deposits of the em-
ployer. The Commission is inclined to accept the experts' opinion, but
a hearing may be had if there are objections. Normal appeal remedies
are available.5 6
Cleveland has adopted a plan of impartial medical panels with a
unique feature. The experts (a panel of three is used) report is limited
to pre-trial use. At trial no mention can be made of the fact that an
impartial expert was used or that a witness at the trial served on such
a panel. If this is done a mistrial is declared.
It is to be noted that a panel can be used only if the parties agree.
Compensation of the experts is based on a schedule set up by the medi-
cal society and approved by the court.
The plan was used four times in the first year of operation. The
reasons for its infrequent use are listed as inability to identify im-
partial experts as such to the jury inconvenience of using three panel-
ists, and the requirement that the parties must agree to the use of the
expert.57
Los Angeles has also adopted a plan of impartial medical testi-
mony. It follows the typical pattern with some exceptions. No expert
panelist will be used unless all the parties agree to his selection. During
trial, the party who requested the expert initially may call him, but he
will appear only if the judge approves. The expert's fee is in accord
with a schedule set up by the California Industrial Accident Commis-
sion. It is paid by the party asking for the witness, but if he is unable
to pay the county assumes the obligation. A serious limitation in all
cases where an expert is employed is that the Chief Judge must handle
the entire case.5 8
The discussion of the various plans has basically involved their
dissimilarities with the New York Plan. The accompanying chart will
show the basic similarities of the various planes.
Pros and Cons
One final point remains for discussion: What are the criticisms of
58 Id. at 9.
55 Ibid.
56 Vitro, Impartial Medical Testimony, 27 INs. C. 1. 184, 188-191 (1960).
57 MEDICAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 8.
s Id. at 9.
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the idea of the use of impartial medical expert panel programs? The
following pages will present a bird's eye view of the basic arguments,
pro and con, of impartial medical testimony.
Generally speaking, the arguments in favor of the program are
phrased in terms of the need for an improvement in our present sys-
tem. These were presented earlier in this report and will be recapitu-
lated here. The battle of experts or the medical-legal tournament has led
to various evils: There is a tendency to select the more personable
rather than the more expert and scientific medical witness; too much
time is wasted under this system and court calendars have become con-
gested; the wide divergence of medical opinion reflects poorly on the
medical profession; the ascertainment of truth-the primary purpose
of having experts-is frustrated.
The arguments in favor of the impartial plans stress that under these
plans highly specialized and competent testimony will be put into evi-
dence. Further, the savings to the taxpayer, especially under those
plans in which public funds are used, is urged as a reason for initiating
a plan of impartial medical testimony.
There are three standard arguments against the use of the impartial
expert.
The first of these is that medical science is not an exact science.
There are vast areas of medicine where science is uncertain, still ex-
perimenting. Medical views have changed-what was once thought
improper may now be preferred. There are areas of black and white,
but there are also large areas of gray, where even the most renowned
experts may honestly disagree. To say that these honest differences of
opinion reflect bias is a "sinister and unfortunate suggestion implicit
in the plan." To equate impartiality with the possession of a monopoly
on the correct medical answer is an obivously naive approach- 9
The answer to this argument agrees that the impartial expert may
not always be right. It points out that the adversary system and the
impartial system may both produce the wrong answer. But the chances
of getting the correct answer are much greater with the impartial medi-
cal testimony plan. This hypothetical has been used to exemplify the
answer:
Assume your son has been hit by an automobile and is lying on
a hospital bed. Resident A thinks the boy's leg should be am-
putated. Resident B thinks it can, at some risk to the boy's life,
be saved by treatment. Assume also that you have plenty of time
to cogitate and act. You can go near-by and get twelve members
of society whose minds are uncluttered with any information
about the medical problem and get them to decide who's right
A or B. In the process you can freely use all your years of learn-
ing and experience fully to examine and cross-examine before
59 Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony, 34 TEm, rx L. Q. 416, 419-20 (1961).
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your twelve "jurors" both Doctor A and Doctor B. On the
other hand you have the alternative of following the opinion
of one of the city's leading experts on the very medical dilemma
which you face, a man who has spent his life studying and
working with it, a man whom the State Medical Society tell
you is as knowledgeable on the intricacies of the problem as
anyone they have to suggest. Which method of solving your
problem are you going to adopt ?60
The second major criticism of the plans is that in many areas of
medicine there are different schools of thought which will condition
and predetermine the medical expert's answer to a problem. The proper
answer will then turn on which expert's name is next in rotation and
what school of thought he belongs to on a particular medical issue.
. . . the validity of the litigant's complaints will be judged by
these conceptions or preconceptions even though a substantial
body of medical thought may differ. The injured plaintiff will
be judged by the fortuitous circumstances of the 'impartial'
doctor's school of thought.6 1
The answer to this argument first advances the proposition that
there are not nearly so many honest splits of medical opinion as the
opponents of the plan would lead one to believe. The answer counter
argues that the proposition may be more disastrously settled by a jury,
advised of the various schools of thought, attempting to solve the con-
flict themselves. "Coin tossing" is a phrase often used in this connec-
tion.6 2 It is suggested that an impartial and informed expert would be
the one most likely to state the difference of opinion and the reasons
therefor.6
3
The objection most strenuously raised by the opponents to the plan
is that once the jury knows that the expert is court appointed, he will
be seen as wearing a cloak of infallibility and the jury will follow what-
ever opinion is espoused by the impartial expert. It has been put that
the expert opinion "exudes an almost ineradicable odor of sanctity. '"6 4
Since membership on the panel is represented as the quintes-
sence of objectivity and as the criterion of reliability and valid
opinion, it is obvious that in the overwhelming number of cases
the panel doctor will simply come to court, deliver his judgment,
his medical formulation will be treated almost as a matter of law
and that will be the end of the matter.6 5
The answer given this argument is three pronged; the impartial
expert will be the most candid about the areas of difficulty and uncer-
60 Griffin, Impartial Medical Testimony: A Trial Lawyer in Favor, 34 TEMPLE
L. Q. 402, 407-08 (1961).6 1 Lord, Book Review, 20 TEMPLE L. Q. 473 (1956).
62 Griffin, supra note 60, at 409-411.
63 SPECIAL COssaMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 33.64 Lord, supra note 61, at 473-74.
65 Levy, supra note 59, at 426.
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tainty; the parties are still free to call their own expert witnesses and
finally, the expert may be cross examined. 6
This latter answer is said to "ignore litigative facts of life ..
A party doesn't cross examine court appointed experts and hope to
convince a jury that the expert is wrong.6 7
Furthermore it is a curious twist to denominate the jury as in-
competent to decide medical issues under our present adversary
system, yet competent and qualified to reject the pronouncement
of the court's specially appointed oracle, labeled by court sanc-
tion as giving the best possible proof. The likelihood is over-
whelming that his testimony will prevail, not because of its
validity but because of its source.68
So run the chief arguments, pro and con, of a novel approach to a
serious legal problem. What the answer to this problem is remains
uncertain. If it is decided that the use of the impartial medical expert
program is the best solution for a particular jurisdiction, what must
be done?
Basic Requirements
Both the New York Report and the Allegheny Report set out the
fundamental ingredients of a successful system of impartial medical
testimony. New York's Report lists but three requirements: financing
by neutral funds, a pre-trial (or equivalent) set up, and the coopera-
tion of local medical groups.69 The Report indicates that the plan need
not be confined to metropolitan areas. However, it would appear that
it may be difficult in less densely populated areas to get the real heart
of the plan-sufficient qualified experts. Although the less populous
areas may not have the problem of court congestion to any great ex-
tent, the underlying problem of the quality of medical testimony may
be present and perhaps more acute in these areas. It may be noted too
that the plan of impartial experts has not withstood any test in non-
metropolitan districts.
The Allegheny Report is more elaborate in its litany of require-
ments. The recommendation is that first the medical societies be re-
sponsible for the selection of the experts and that the list of panel
members be confidential and based on a rotating system. Further, the
judge or the parties should be allowed to call a panel expert into a
given litigation. The expert should have available to him all facilities
for necessary tests. Contact between expert and parties' attorneys should
be discouraged. There must be freedom for the parties to call their own
experts. The right to cross-examine should be available to the judge and
to the parties. The fee should be comparable to that the expert would
66 SPECIAL CoMrmrm, op. cit. supra note 9, at 33.67 Levy, supra note 59, at 427.
68 Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony, 30 PA. B. A. Q. 348, 358 (1959).
69 SpEcIAL Commi=rr, op. cit. supra note 9, at 36.
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receive from a private patient in moderate circumstances, but the source
of payment (if not borne by neutral funds) should be kept from the
expert until the litigation is complete. The Report stresses that the key
to a successful plan is that the jury be told that the witness is an im-
partial expert chosen and appointed by the court.
7 0
One final observation: If a plan of the type discussed in this article
is adopted, there must be a strenuous program of education among the
bar, the bench and the medical profession. The successful implementa-
tion of a program of impartial medical testimony demands not only a
thorough scheme of education but maximum interprofessional co-
operation. RoCm CARTER
70 MEIlcAL LEGAL CoMMITEE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 22-23.
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